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ASK THE PROFESSOR:
“OMG! WHAT DID MF
GLOBAL DO?”1
B y P r o f e s s o r Rona l d Fi l l e r 2

MF Global Inc. (“MFG”) was registered as a broker-dealer (“BD”) with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and as a futures commission merchant (“FCM”) with the U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).
In fact, it was one of the largest U.S. FCMs
with approximately $7,270,000,000 in
customer segregated funds as of August
31, 2011.3 On or about Sunday, October
30, 2011, MFG reported to regulators4
that a material shortfall appeared to exist
in the amount of customer funds required
to be segregated under the Commodity Exchange Act5 and CFTC Regulation 1.206
promulgated thereunder.7 Shortly thereafter, MFG’s clearing privileges at several
clearing houses were suspended and MFG
was put on liquidation only trading status.8
James W. Giddens, the Bankruptcy
Trustee appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court, stated in the SIPC’s Trustee Emergency Motion:
1. More than 150,000 customer accounts
were frozen on October 31st;

should total approximately $5.45
billion, and that the CME
held
approximately
$4.0
billion in cash or collateral as of
that date.
4. The Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (“SIPC”) filed an application under the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, as amended
(“SIPA”),9 for the entry of a protective order placing MFG in liquidation under SIPA as MFG could no
longer comply with the requirements
regarding financial responsibility under Section 15(c)(3) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”)10
and SEC Rules 15c3-3 and 17a-3.11
5. On October 31, 2011, the Honorable
Paul Engelmayer, U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York,
entered an Order (“the MFG Liquidation Order”) which commenced liquidation of MFG pursuant to SIPA in a
case captioned as: Securities Investor
CONTINUED ON PAGE 3

2. Of this total, more than 50,000 accounts were trading futures contracts
as of that date;
3. The
Chicago
Mercantile
Exchange (“CME”) estimated that
MFG’s customer segregated funds
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Protection Corp. v. MF Global Inc., Case
No. 11-CIV-7750 (PAE).
6. The MFG Liquidation Order appointed
James W. Giddens as Trustee for the liquidation of the business of MFG and appointed
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, as counsel to
the Trustee.12
According to the SIPC Trustee’s Emergency
Motion, there appears to be a shortfall in the
amount of customer funds required to be held
in segregation pursuant to CEA Section 4d13 and
CFTC Regulation 1.2014 According to numerous
media reports, the amount of this shortfall has
ranged between $900 million on the high end to
$600 million on the low end. This paper will address what may have caused such shortfall and
what actions may be pending.

Background
This author has written many articles recently
on how futures customer funds must be held by
an FCM, how the U.S. rules differ from similar
customer fund rules in the U.K., and how initial
margin is determined.15 As noted in these articles,
one of the most important customer protection
themes underlying the CEA and CFTC regulations is the protection of customer assets, cash
and collateral, held by an FCM to margin the
customer’s underlying futures contracts. These
rules are sacrosanct. Unlike checking and stock
accounts, which have insurance programs, funded by the U.S. government and industry firms, to
protect customers of banks (e.g., FDIC Insurance)
and customers holding stock accounts (e.g., SIPC
Insurance), futures customers do not receive any
special insurance proceeds if their FCM files for
bankruptcy, like MFG did.
However, the applicable laws and regulations
strictly govern how FCMs must properly fund
the customer segregated accounts and significantly restrict how FCMs may invest the customer
funds. For example, one important restriction is
included in CFTC Regulation 1.25, which provides that an FCM may invest customer property
in only certain permissible investments and holds
the FCM liable for any losses that may result
from such investments.16
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Equally as important, upon deposit in a protected customer segregated account, customer
funds must remain in such protected accounts
until returned back to the customer. Therefore,
whenever an FCM transfers funds to a derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”), commonly
referred to as a clearing house or central counterparty, the funds held by a DCO must also comply
with CFTC Regulation 1.20. Similarly, if a U.S.
customer wants to trade futures on a non-U.S.
futures exchange, the funds used to margin the
non-U.S. futures positions must be held in another protected account, called a secured amount
account under CFTC Regulation 30.7.17 Thus, at
all times, customer funds used to margin futures
contracts are held in these protective accounts,
solely for the benefit of the customers.18

Insolvency of an FCM
Whenever an FCM files for bankruptcy, and
that FCM, like MFG, is jointly registered as both
a BD and FCM, a SIPC Trustee is appointed.
Thus, Mr. Giddens was appointed as the SIPC
Trustee for MFG, just like he was when Lehman
Brothers Inc. filed for bankruptcy in September
2008. However, although SIPA plays an important role with respect to any securities account
held by customers of the BD/FCM, Part 190 of
the CFTC Regulations provides key guidance
with respect to the futures customer accounts
held by the BD/FCM.19
An FCM’s insolvency does not necessarily
mean that futures customers will be adversely
impacted by any loss of funds. For example, two
very large FCMs, REFCO in 2005 and Lehman
Brothers in 2008, both filed for bankruptcy protection without incurring any futures customer
losses to the extent such funds were held in a
protected customer segregated account. In fact,
this author, who was a Managing Director in
the Capital Markets Prime Services Division at
Lehman Brothers before joining the faculty at
New York Law School, was invited back to assist Lehman Brothers Inc. during that infamous
week of September 15-19, 2008 to help move the
underlying customer funds and open positions to
other well-capitalized FCMs or liquidate the open
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futures positions and return the margin property
back to the respective customer. To say the least,
it was an interesting and challenging week. The
big difference between Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and MFG now is that the registered
Lehman entity, Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”),
had not filed for bankruptcy on September 15,
2008, the day that its parent company, Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc, and other Lehman affiliates filed for bankruptcy. However, with respect
to MFG, both its parent company, MF Global
Holdings Inc., and MFG, the registered BD/FCM,
both filed for bankruptcy protection the same day.
This difference provided customers of LBI with
important opportunities and flexibility to transfer
and/or liquidate open positions under their own
direction and control, and to transfer the underlying cash and collateral used to margin these open
positions under their direction as well.

MFG’s Bankruptcy
MFG filed for bankruptcy on Monday, October
31, 2011. While many of its customers may have
moved their open positions and funds before that
date, such transfers took place before the public
was aware of its bankruptcy proceedings.20 During this first week, much was reported by various media outlets but the full set of facts has not
been made public, and will not be until all the
various investigations now taking place by many
parties, including the CFTC and the SEC, report
their findings. However, Mr. Giddens did take
some important actions through the Emergency
Motion, providing important transfers of open
positions and part of the underlying cash and collateral used to fund these open positions.
On November 2, 2011, Judge Martin Glenn of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, issued an Order granting the
Emergency Motion requested by Mr. Giddens,
among other things:
1. The Trustee may continue to operate MFG in
the ordinary course until 6:00pm on Friday,
November 4th;
2. The Trustee shall use his best efforts to complete the Account Transfers to one or more
FCMs that have agreed to accept such open
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customer positions, together with up to 60%
of the underlying customer property used to
fund those open positions;21
3. The account transfers may not be avoided under Section 764(b) of the Bankruptcy Code;
and
4. The Trustee shall not be held liable to any
claims that may result with any such transfers.22

So, What Happened with MFG?
Like most players in the futures business, one
can only speculate what actually happened that
caused any shortfall in the customer funds held at
MFG, if any shortfall does in fact exist. The truth
and facts will soon be revealed. The following are
only theories as to what might have happened. To
be honest, given the excellent record of the futures
industry protecting futures customer, this author,
who has spent his past 35+ years defending this
great industry, truly hopes that none of these theories prove to be true.
1. The press has reported that MFG lost substantial amounts betting on European bonds
and sovereign debts. What has not been revealed is what MFG entity actually made
these investments if, in fact, they were made
and these investments resulted in substantial losses under our mark-to-the-market
accounting method. Were these investments
made by MFG, the registered BD/FCM, or
by another MF Global entity? If the former,
then MFG would most likely not have the
requisite regulatory capital to continue to operate as a registered BD/FCM entity. This is
the most likely scenario as Mr. Giddens in his
Emergency Motion stated that MFG could
no longer meet its requirements for financial
responsibility but he provided little detail
behind this statement. If, however, these socalled European bets were made in a different
MF Global entity, and that MF Global entity was not guaranteed by MFG, then MFG
could possibly continue to operate. Since this
did not occur, and a SIPC Trustee was ap-
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pointed, the former is presumably the most
likely theory.
2. Even if MFG lost substantial amount of
capital through these investments, or even
through poor operating revenues, these facts
should not have caused a shortfall in the customer segregated account. The U.S. regulatory system is designed to protect all non-defaulting customers of an FCM. Based on the
facts known to date, no large futures customer at MFG traded in a manner that caused a
large trading loss that caused MFG to file for
bankruptcy. This is a key statement because
applicable CEA and CFTC regulations were
written in part from this perspective, that is,
that a large futures customer could trade in
such a manner that could result in the FCM’s
bankruptcy. In other words, such a large oneday trading loss exceeds the regulatory capital
of the FCM resulting in its insolvency. Under
this scenario, the clearing houses, pursuant
to their rules, provides a systematic approach
to stabilize the market and provide the necessary amounts to those customers who earned
trading profits from these same trades under
the zero-sum game model. These procedures
include, among other things, the use of guaranty funds, the right to assess non-defaulting
clearing members and even using funds of the
non-defaulting customers of the bankrupt
FCM clearing member. However, this situation did not occur with MFG. Therefore, any
shortfall presumably did not result from futures trading. However, if MFG did in fact
invest its own capital in the European bonds,
and thus lost substantial amounts, one must
ask whether MFG took the necessary deductions from such regulatory capital, as these
investments must be marked-to-the market
on an ongoing basis.
3. The key question, and one bothering this
author the most, is whether MFG misappropriated customer funds held in the protected
account, improperly invested such funds
outside the permissible investments set forth
in CFTC Rule 1.25 or did properly comply
with CFTC Rule 1.25 but did not replenish
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the segregated accounts in a timely manner
as these permissible investments lost money.
CFTC Rule 1.25 permits investments in obligations of sovereign nations. It will be interesting to see what type of investments were
made by MFG with respect to the customer
segregated funds.
Following the transfer of open positions and
a major portion of the cash and collateral held
to margin these open positions on November
4th, other developments were noted by the SIPC
Trustee, namely:
1. The SIPC Trustee had established procedures
to transfer securities accounts held by MFG
to other SIPC firms.
2. The SIPC Trustee has retained Ernst &
Young as forensic accountants and Deloitte
to assist in the account transfers and processing of claims.
3. The SIPC Trustee has established a website
and call center to facilitate communications
with customers and creditors of MFG. The
website is: www.mfglobaltrustee.com
Also note that all of the major clearing houses
have issued advisories regarding the transfers of
open positions and collateral. You should go to
their websites to view updates and related issues.
We also need more information regarding what’s
happening with the transfer of open positions and
collateral outside the U.S. as MFG’s customer accounts traded futures globally. This may be the
subject of a forthcoming article.

Conclusion
As noted above, for the sake of this industry,
I truly hope that none of these theories prove to
be true. But if they do, one can only presume
that regulatory changes are brewing at a time
when the industry is undergoing major regulatory changes as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act.23
Query, do we really need any such regulatory
changes just because one firm may have acted in
an improper way?
© RONALD H. FILLER. Reprinted with Permission.
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NOTES
1 This article was written on November 8, 2011, to
meet the publisher’s deadline. Obviously, new
events may have subsequently occurred that will
impact many of the issues discussed herein.
2 Ronald Filler is a Professor of Law and the
Director of the Center on Financial Services Law
at New York Law School (“NYLS”). He is also
the Program Director of the LLM  in Financial
Services Law Graduate Program at NYLS which
offers more than 40 courses involving various
aspects of the global financial services industry,
including several courses on derivatives law and
products. Go to www.nyls.edu/financellm to
learn more about this very unique LLM program.
Before joining the NYLS faculty in 2008, he was
a Managing Director in the Capital Markets
Prime Services Division at Lehman Brothers Inc.
in its New York headquarters. Prof. Filler also
acts as a Senior Consultant for Allen & Overy,
a major international law firm. You can reach
Prof. Filler via email at: ronald.filler@nyls.edu
3 See Report on “Financial Data on Futures
Commission Merchants”, CFTC Website (www.
cftc.gov). This report also showed that MFG had
approximately $495,000,000 in “adjusted net
capital”, a defined term under CFTC Regulation
1.17 and had excess adjusted net capital of
approximately $167,000,000, also as of August
31, 2011.
4 Presumably, the CFTC, the SEC, the National
Futures Association (“NFA”), the Financial
Industry Regulatory Agency (“FINRA”) and certain
securities and futures exchanges, such as the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (“CME”). The CME  acted
as the designated self-regulatory organization
(“DSRO”) for MFG in the futures industry.
5 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
6 17 C.F.R. § 1.20. CFTC Regulation 1.20 states: “All
customer funds shall be separately accounted
for and segregated as belonging to commodity
or option customers. Such customer funds
when deposited with any bank, trust company,
clearing organization or another futures
commission merchant shall be deposited under
an account name which clearly identifies them
as such and shows that they are segregated as
required by the Act and this part.”
7 See “Emergency Motion of James W. Giddens,
Trustee for the Liquidation of MF Global Inc.
for an Order Approving the Transfer of Certain
Segregated Customer Commodity Positions and
Extending the Trustee’s Authorization to Operate
the Business of MF Global Inc. in the Ordinary
Course”, filed on November 2, 1022 before the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York in In Re MF Global Inc., Case No. 112790 (MG) SIPA. (hereinafter referred to as “SIPC
Trustee’s Emergency Motion).
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Ibid, at page 2.
78aaa et seq.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c)(3) and 78q(a).
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3 and 240.15a-3.
Supra, note vi, at pages 2-3.
17. U.S.C. 6d.
Supra, note v.
See Are Customer Funds Segregated/Secured
Amount Funds Properly Protected after
Lehman?, Journal on the Law of Investment
& Risk Management Products, The Futures
& Derivatives Law Report (November 2008);
Ask the Professor—What is Margin and How
Is It (Or Should be) Determined?, Journal on
the Investment & Risk Management Products,
The Futures & Derivatives Law Report (March
2009); and Consumer protection: How U.K.
Client Money Rules Differ From U.S. Customer
Segregated Rules When a Custodian Firm Fails
to Treat Customer Funds Properly, Journal of
Taxation and Regulation of Financial Institutions
(May/June 2011).
17 C.F.R. 1.25. Please note that the CFTC has
proposed changes to the provisions of CFTC
Rule 1.25. If adopted as proposed, the types
of permissible investments and the amount
of investment in such permissible investments
will be significantly changed from the current
environment.
17 C.F.R. 30.7.
CFTC Regulation 1.20 also requires an FCM  to
receive an acknowledgement letter from the
custodian bank or other depository that may
hold futures customer assets which confirms
that the custodian bank or depository may not
apply any of the assets held in the protected
customer account to satisfy any obligations
owed by the FCM to the custodian bank.
See Part 190 of the CFTC Regulations, 17 C.F.R.
190 et seq.
According to the SPIC’s Trustee Emergency
Motion, the CME  estimated that the amount
held in customer segregated funds totaled
approximately $5.45 billion as of October 31,,
2011, whereas the CFTC reported that MFG held
approximately $7.27 billion as of August 31,
2011, a decrease of over $1.8 billion in the past
two months.
As it turns out, six different FCMs accepted
the transfer of open futures positions held
on the books of MFG by Friday, November 4 th.
This involved the transfer of approximately
15,000 futures customers and approximately
$1.45 billion in cash and collateral from the
CME. Other clearing houses and exchanges
cooperated as well and made similar
transfers.
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22 See “Order Granting Emergency Motion of
James w. Giddens, Trustee for the Liquidation
of MF Global Inc., for an Order Approving
the Transfer of Certain Segregated Customer
Commodity Positions and Extending the
Trustee’s Authorization to Operate the Business
of MF Global Inc. in the Ordinary Course”, case
No. 11-2790 (MG) SIPA, November 2, 2011.
23 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, P.L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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